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CYBERPROPERTY AND JUDICIAL DISSONANCE:
THE TROUBLE WITH DOMAIN NAME CLASSIFICATION

Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen*

INTRODUCTION

The nature of cyberspace continues to be woven into the fabric of our
daily existence.' Not surprisingly, cyberspace and the expansion of ecommerce 2 pose challenges to existing law, 3 particularly the legal definition
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor Law, Seattle University School of Law; J.D. 1995, Northeastern University School of Law;
B.A. 1990, Oberlin College; Intellectual Property Associate, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson,
New York City; Intellertual Property Associate, Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn, LLP, New York
City. Thanks to my colleague, Professor Benjamin Davis, ABA Co-Reporter of the Online Dispute
Resolution Committee, for many wonderful discussions in the course of eight months about domain
names and property. Thanks to Erik Hille, Associate Dean Jeff Maine, and Dr. Andrew Phan for listening to my discussions on domain names and property. This article and its companion appearing in
Washington & Lee Law Review are the results of the discussions. Special thanks to my soul mate Erik
Darwin Hille and our son Khai-Leif Nguyen-Hille for their love, kindness, and support. Copyright ©
2001 by Prof. Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen.
Lawrence Lessig eloquently wrote:
Cyberspace is a place. People live there. They experience all the sorts of things
that they experience in real space there. . . . They experience it in groups in
communities, among strangers, and among people they come to know and sometimes like-or love.
While they are in that place, cyberspace, they are also here. They are at a terminal screen, eating chips, ignoring the phone. They are downstairs on the computer, late at night, while their husbands are asleep. They are at work, at cybercafes, and in computer labs. They live this life there, while here, and then at
some point in the day, they jack out and are only here. They rise from the machine, in a bit of a daze, and turn around. They have returned.
So where are they when they are in cyberspace?
Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 190 (1999).
2 In June 1995, there were only 23,500 web sites on the World Wide Web. Less than six years
later, as of March 2001, there are 28,611,177 web sites on the World Wide Web. Robert Hobbes Zakon,
Hobbes' Internet Timeline v5.3, at http://www.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Intemet/History/HIT.html (last
visited Aug. 13, 2001); U.S. Department of Commerce News, Monthly Retail surveys Branch, U.S.
Census Bureau, May 31, 2000, at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html (reporting that "retail
e-commerce sales in first quarter 2001 were $7.0 billion, up 33.5 percent from first quarter 2000").
3 For example, existing trademark law could not keep up with cyberspace. In response to that
problem Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). See Sporty's Farm
LL.C. v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that federal trademark
dilution law failed to cope with dilution of trademarks and other trademark related problems in the
Internet). Also, digital contact is made possible in cyberspace and that has challenged the notion of
physical contact as "minimum contacts" for personal jurisdiction. Christopher M. Kindel, When Digital
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of cyberproperty domain names. The nature of cyberspace allows many ecompanies to possess no traditional assets such as buildings and inventories.4 Some e-companies own few computers, often using service providers
to maintain their web sites.' In the virtual space that e-companies inhabit,
the primary assets that e-companies own are intangibles such as domain
names, 6 customer information,7 and intellectual property that includes business method patents,' copyrights, and trademarks.9
Domain names have become the valuable intangible real estate of cyberspace.'" For example, the domain name sex.com was valued at $250
million; l business.com at $7.5 million;' 2 and loan.com at $3.0 million.'3
Contacts Equal Minimum Contacts: How Fourth Circuit Courts Should Assess Personal Jurisdiction in
Trademark Disputes over Internet Domain Names, 78 N.C. L. REV. 2105 (2000) (arguing that the
traditional territorial-based due process analysis for personal jurisdiction does not adequately address
issues related to trademark claims over domain names).
4 See generally William F. Alderman, Due Diligence in the Securities Litigation Reform Era:
Practical Tips from Litigators on the Effective Conduct, Documentation and Defense of Underwriter
Investigation, WL 1265 PLI/Corp 413, 446 (2001) (noting that because Internet companies have intellectual property as their principal assets, different due diligence considerations must be applied in the
emerging sector); A. Michele Dickerson, From Jeans to Genes: The Evolving Nature of Property of the
Estate, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 299-301 (1999) (noting that many cybercompanies own very few tangible assets. For example, Amazon.com owns no stores and few tangible assets, and yet it is worth as
much as Bames & Noble, Inc. and Borders Groups, Inc. combined. Netscape Communications corporation has assets primarily in intangible property and a limited number of computers and leasehold
rights.).
5 Dickerson, supra note 4, at 299-301.
6 Francis G. Conrad, Dot.coms in Bankruptcy Valuations Under Title 11 or www.snipehunt in
the Darknoreoreg/noassets.com, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REv. 417, 427 (2001) (noting domain names as ecompanies' assets).
7 Walter W. Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankrupcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which
Holds the Trump Card?, 38 HOUS. L. REv. 777, 782-803 (2001) (analyzing the property interests and
contract aspects of customer data collected by Internet companies); Jane Kaufman Winn & James R.
Wrathall, Who Owns the Customer? The Emerging Law of Commercial Transactions in Electronic
Customer Data, 56 Bus. LAw. 213, 214 (2000) (discussing how the use of the intangible asset databases
becomes more visible and controversial due to the ability of web sites to mine and profile consumer's
information).
8 Lance D. Reich, Dot.Com (Patent Pending): Patents Are Now Central to Business Strategy,
FLA. B.J., Mar. 2001, at 42 (noting and explaining the latest patent rush by Internet companies); Julia
Angwin, "Business Method" Patents, Key to Priceline, Draw Growing Protest, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 3,
2000, at BI, available at 2000 WL-WSJ 26611830 (reporting the explosion of business method patents
in the Internet and that Priceline's sixty-six patents and 400 pending business method patent applications are valued at $1 billion); Jane Martinson, Silicon Alley Turns Nasty, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 30,
1999, at 28 (reporting the aggressive efforts of Internet companies enforcing business method patents).
9 Alderman, supra note 4, at passim (identifying the types of intellectual property assets owned
by online companies such as copyrights, utility patents, design patents, trade secrets, and trademarks);
Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 255, 261-62
(2000) (noting that the assets of a typical Internet company are intangibles, including trademarks, trade
names, copyrights, patents, customers information, and preferences).
10 As many failed e-companies approach bankruptcy, their valuable assets consist of domain
names. Conrad, supra note 6, at 429-32 (reviewing methodologies for valuing failed dot.coms' domain
name assets); Dickerson, supra note 4, at 299-301 (referring to domain names as valuable cyberassets).
11 Martin Kady, Sex.com Fight Rages, Bus. J., Aug. 18, 2000, available at http://www.sanjose.
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The monetary value of some domain names suggests that it would be
proper to classify domain names as property. Yet both courts and legislatures are far more ambivalent in their treatment of domain names, leaving
the lingering question: Are domain names property?
The inquiry into whether domain names are property leads to other related questions. Do domain names exist apart from the value or goodwill
added by the user?14 Or, are all domain names merely products of service
contracts between a registrar and a registrant, and thus not treated as property for garnishment proceedings?15 Are the interests in domain names
similar to license rights? 6 Should some domain names be bestowed with
property interests while other domain names are treated as lacking such
interests? 7
To most courts, these questions are, or will be, of first impression. Recent judicial decisions relating to legal classification of domain names
failed to adequately appraise the nature of cyberproperty in general, and
domain names in particular, and their role in the marketplace of ecommerce.18 Worse, the precedent established threatens to render meaningless the valuation of domain names as part of a bankrupt cyber-estate. 9
Further, as the Internet economy matures, the case law threatens to hamper
the use of domain names and other cyberproperty in secured transactions,
as well as commercial transactions in general.
Part I examines the rising value in domain names on the open market.
The spectacular rise in the monetary value of some domain names in the
marketplace does not qualify them as property entitled to some form of
legal protection. Part II focuses on the bundle of rights property theory and
examines whether domain names fit within that definition. If domain names
are property, are they similar to trademarks? Part Im discusses trademark
bcentral.comlsanjose/stories/2000/08/21/story5.html (reporting sex.com is worth $250 million); Jon
Shwartz, Sex.com Ownership Ruling Expected, Domain Name Hotly Disputed, USA TODAY, Aug. 2,
2000, at 3B (reporting sex.com is worth around $250 million).
12 Greg Johnson, The Costly Gamefor Net Names, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al, available at
2000 WL 2229499 (reporting eCompanies, a Santa Monica-based e-commerce incubator firm bought
the domain name business.com for $7.5 million).
13 Daniel Joelson, Banks Square Off over Internet Domain Names, BANK TECH. NEWS, Nov. 22,
2000, at 1, available at 2000 WL 17153605 (reporting that the importance of having the right domain
names induced Bank of America to acquire loans.com for $3 million); Patrick Larkin, Generic Web Site
Names Callingfor Big Bucks, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 5, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3490314 (reporting
the feverish market for generic domain names); Winn L. Rosch, Domains: Today's Name Game, PLAIN
DEALER, July 20, 2000, at 2C, available at 2000 WL 5157293 (listing the prices for several easy to
remember and recognize domain names).
14 Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D. Va. 1999).
15 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80,89 (Va. 2000).
16 Conrad, supra note 6, at 429-30.
17
18

See infra Part V.
See infra Part IV(B).

19 Conrad, supra note 6, at 429 (suggesting that the domain name classification question must be
answered first before a domain name can be properly valued for failed dot.coms). See also infra Part VI.
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law and analyzes the types of domain names protected under trademark
law. The analysis reveals that forcing domain names into the existing
trademark law framework results in inadequacies. Part TV analyzes judicial
dissonance in classifying domain names as service contract rights based on
the formation of domain names through service contract agreements between a registrar and registrant, and as intangible property that does not
merge with a document. Part V focuses on the recent legislation relating to
domain name disputes and subsequent judicial interpretations of the statute.
While the new legislation cures cybersquatting problems, it creates a different problem, as the law now treats some domain names, but not others, as
property. Part VI discusses the implications of judicial dissonance in commercial transactions and bankruptcy proceedings involving domain names.
The Article concludes that the maturing process of e-commerce requires a
clear classification of domain names as intangible property and appropriate
legislative protection for the type of domain names not protected under
trademark law.
I.

THE RISING VALUE IN DOMAIN NAMES

A quest for a satisfactory answer regarding classification of domain
names demands an examination of domain name usage and treatment in the
Internet economy. Domain names are unique; there are no two identical
domain names on the Internet. 20 Domain names are assigned on a first
come, first serve basis. 2' Currently, memorable domain names 22 are in high
demand in the primary market. 23 Most, if not all, short, easy to remember
domain names are no longer available in the primary market. 24 Some jour20 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting domain
names are both unique and global); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to
Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50 DUKE L.J. 17, 37-43 (2000) (explaining the Domain
Name System).
21 Sallen, 273 F.3d at 19 (noting domain names registration system is a non-governmentally
operated, first-come, first-served system).
22 Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual PropertyLaw, 1900-2000, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2215 (2000) (observing memorable domain names are generic and descriptive
names, thus, they are "poor candidates" for trademark protection).
23 See, e.g., Jason Black, What's in a Name?, INTERNET WORLD, July 15, 2001, at 20, available
at 2001 WL 8972673 (reporting the advantages of choosing the right, memorable domain names);
Sharon Ferguson, Reserving Your Place on the Internet: Winning Strategies for the Domain Name
Game, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Apr. 27, 2001, availableat 2001 WL 8986548 ("[D]emand for domain
names is soaring, and most of the desirable names are already taken."); Heather N. Mewes, Memorandum of Understandingon the Generic Top-Level Domain Name Space of the Internet Domain Name
System, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 235, 244 (1998) (noting that the problem of the scarcity of domain
names is fueled by the expansion of the Web and the popularity of the top level domain, ".com"); Todd
W. Krieger, Note, Internet Domain Names and Trademarks: Strategiesfor Protecting Brand Names in
Cyberspace, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1998) (noting that companies all want memorable
domain names).
24 Victoria S. Stefanakos, Up Front: Fire Sales, at Least Partof the Net is Red-Hot, Bus. WK.,
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nalists have reported that about ninety-eight percent of the English language has been registered as domain names.2 5 Indeed, merely 1200 words
are left for domain name registrations. 26 Words with few letters are most
likely only available in the secondary market at a price that is significantly
larger than the initial registration fee.27 For example, business.com was sold
for $7.5 million, korea.com for $5.5 million, loans.com at $3.0 million, and
auto.com for $2.2 million.2 8
In the open market, domain names are commodities for monetary exchange, 29 as there are numerous active web sites buying and selling domain
names,30 typically by online auction.3' Some sites also provide methods for
estimating the monetary value of domain names. 32 In general, the more
Apr. 16, 2001, at 14, available at 2001 WL 2206423 (reporting that more than 28 million domain names
have been registered and that all the good domain names are already gone).
25 See, e.g., Black, supranote 23 ("[M]ore than 98 percent of the words listed in a standard English dictionary have been registered as domain names."); Denise McNabb, The Name Game-Join the
Dots, THE DOMINION, July 16, 2001, at 13, available at 2000 WL 21878565 (reporting that only 1200
words in the English language have not been registered as domain names).
26 McNabb, supra note 25, at 13.
27 See, e.g., Lauren Weber, Electronic Commerce: Bidders Lose Itch for Generic Names on Web
Domains, AM. BANKER, June 28, 2001, at 18, available at 2001 WL 3912527 (reporting the domain
name financialservices.com generated a bid of $235,000 and observing that such bid is smaller than
loans.com which was sold to Bank of America for $3 million and mortgage.com, sold to ABN Amro for
$1.8 million); Stefanakos, supra note 24, at 14 (reporting that many sought-after domain names are
offered for sales for the first time). PlanetRX.com is selling twenty-six domain names that it had registered for its now defunct online drugstore. Id.; Apps Briefs, NETwORK WORLD, Jan. 8, 2001, at 29,
availableat 2001 WL 10796964 (reportingthe growth in domain name secondary market, including the
acquisition by VeriSign (which also owns NSI), of GreatDomains.com, an auction site that will resell
their domain names); Sarah Andrews, The Cyber Space, THE N. ECHO, Nov. 23, 2000, at 05, available
at 2000 WL 29569307 (reporting memorable domain names can be worth a fortune, for example, diamondseternally.com is worth £3,175,000).
28 See generally Johnson, supra note 12, at Al (reporting the scarcity of domain names in the
Internet economy and listing the prices of some domain names); Thomas E. Weber, Register.com Aims
to Market InternetAddresses to Everyone, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1999, at B7, available at 1999 WL-WSJ
5446741 ("Domain names have evolved into one of the Internet's most important commodities-and an
increasingly scarce resource. Though the universe of online addresses is theoretically unlimited, the best
addresses get snapped up quickly. A latecomer might find himself stuck with an unwieldy address like
'joespizzaofbrooklyn.com' instead of the easier to type, and remember, 'joes.com."'). The speculation
in domain names, as the founder of the World Wide Web observed, causes a problem that "the better
domain names will wind up with the people or companies that have the most money, crippling fairness
and threatening universality." Tmi BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND
ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 128 (1999).

29 See supra notes 27, 28.
30 See generally http://www.greatdomains.com; http://www.lstdomainbrokers.com; http://www.
domainmart.com.
31 For domain name auction sites, see http://www.ebay.com, http://www.greatdomains.com,
http://www.domainmart.com. See also Gideon Parchomovsky, On Trademarks, Domain Names, and
Internal Auctions, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 232 (2001) (discussing auction theory and the use of
auctions to resolve domain name disputes).
32 GreatDomains.com is a VeriSign company which also owns Network Solutions, Inc. A link to
Verisign is available at Greatdomain.com's home page, http://www.greatdomains.com. GreatDomains.com claims that it owns a proprietary 4C Valuation Model for in-depth analysis of domain
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memorable a domain name, the more value it enjoys. 33 Also, less is more; a
short domain name is worth more than a long domain name.34
The spectacular value of some domain names, not surprisingly, leads
parties to bring lawsuits over ownership of memorable, generic domain
names that are generally not protected under trademark law. 35 For example,
the litigation involving the sex.corn domain name revealed that the defendant engaged in fraudulent tactics in order to secure the ownership of the
domain name." Similar legal battles concerned ownership of other generic
domain names such as e-cash.com, 37 e-cards.com, 38 and e-stamp.com. 39 In
greeting cards, a jury
the litigation involving e-cards.com electronic
40
million.
$4
plaintiff
California
awarded the
Given the rising interest in domain names, domain name panels that
are authorized to resolve domain name disputes have held that Internet domain name brokerages can legitimately speculate about those domain
names. It also claims to use "the largest database of transferred names" in the analysis, "which is extremely market-sensitive, for accuracy." In addition to the in-depth analysis, it provides "FastAppraise"
online for "a fast and reliable indication of value with a quick turnaround." See
http://www.greatdomains.comservices/appraisal/appraisalentry.asp (last visited July 28, 2001). DomainMart.com provides domain name valuation at a minimum price of $75 per domain name and expert
Domaindomain
name.
See
http://www.domainmart.coml
estimates
at $500
per
Names/agent/appraisal/appraisal-enter.html (last visited July 28, 2001).
33 Black, supra note 23 (reporting that the general consensus in the branding industry that memorable, few-letters, and easy to spell are key elements to a good domain name).
34 Id. (quoting Steve Newman, founder and director of GreatDomains.com and co-author of
Domain Names for Dummies that five letters or less is "outstanding" and ten letters or more is "too
long").
35 See infra Part IH for discussion of domain names and trademark law.
36 Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (finding defendant
fraudulently wrote a letter to NSI masquerading as the plaintiff to request the transfer of the domain
name sex.com to defendant); Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1843239, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000)
(ordering defendant to return the domain name sex.com to plaintiff or maintain $25 million to be held
by the Court pending final judgment involving the ownership of sex.com).
37 eCash Techs., Inc. v. Guagliardo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1085 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (resolving a
dispute concerning "eCash" trademark and domain name "ecash.com").
38 E-cards v. King, No. 99-CV-3726 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2000). Plaintiff was a San Franciscobased company in the electronic greeting card business and owned the domain name "e-cards.com"
since 1995. Plaintiff sued defendant for using the domain name "ecards.com" starting in 1996 on unfair
competition grounds. The jury awarded plaintiff a $4 million judgment. Peter Brown, Protecting
Trademarksand Trade Secrets in E-commerce, WL 650 PLI/Pat 127, 142 (2001).
39 Jim Conley, What's in a Hyphen?, ZIFF-DAVIS SMART Bus., July 1, 2000, available at 2000
WL 2000408 (reporting the ongoing battle between E-Stamp.com and eStamps.com).
40 The jury verdict in the E-cards case has raised serious questions concerning the use of unfair
competition law to reverse domain name hijacking. Steven Bonisteel, "E-cards" Flap Has Many Unhappy Returns for Canadians, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, May 12, 2000, available at 2000 WL
21177104 (quoting Internet law expert Michael Geist, a professor at the University of Ottawa Law
School in Canada). Professor Geist stated that the use of unfair competition law, instead of traditional
trademark infringement or cybersquatting law, "provides a new avenue for those that might not have a
strong case on a cybersquatting approach but who can take this unfair competition approach to further
try to either extract damages or reverse hijacked domain names." Id. See also Conley, supra note 39
(reporting law suits concerned generic words with an "e" prefix and hyphen).
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names not protected by trademark law.4' In Shirmax Retail, Ltd. v. CES
Marketing Group Inc., the panel held that the domain name registrant's
business of reselling generic domain names, such as thyme.com, does not
amount to "bad faith" registration or use of domain names.42 Similarly, in
Car Toys, Inc. v. Informa Unlimited, Inc., a different panel decided that the
domain name broker who engaged in the sale of merely descriptive domain
names did not act in bad faith, even though the descriptive name at issue,
cartoys.net, had been registered as a trademark.43
Domain names are valuable because they play a significant role in
business branding in Internet commerce. 44 On the Internet, a commentator
observes, shopping may be "analogous to walking into what one thought
was a grocery store, only to find automobile parts on the shelves. 45 A web
consumer looking for a product or service to purchase generally has two
options: searching for a company that sells the product or service by entering the domain name the consumer already knows; or making an educated
guess to find a company's web site by entering a word or phrase in a search
engine.' An easy to remember domain name can produce a large number
of hits without much effort by capitalizing on Internet technology and how
web users behave online. 47 Domain names that are self-explanatory
41 Shirmax Retail Ltd v. CES Mktg. Group Inc., Case No. AF-0104 (eResolution Mar. 2000),
available at http:lwww.eresolution.com/services/dnd/decisions/0104.htm; Car Toys, Inc. v. Informa
Unlimited, Inc., Case No. FA0002000093682 (Nat'l Arbitration Forum Mar. 2000), available at
http.//www.arbitration-forum.comdomains/decisions/93682.htm. EResolution and the National Arbitration Forum were created by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to
solve domain name disputes under the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy. Their decisions do
not constitute arbitration that prohibits judicial review. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745,
752-53 (E.D. Va. 2001) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act restrictions on judicial review of
arbitration awards are not applicable to mandatory administrative proceedings conducted under
ICANN's Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy).
42 Shirmax, Case No. AF-0104.
43 Car Toys, Case No. FA0002000093682.
44 Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 275 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[D]omain
names have become business identifiers important to offering goods and services on the Internet.");
Ferguson, supra note 23 (listing criteria for an ideal domain name that would serve as corporate locator
and identifier); Steven Brier, Easily Remembered Makes Big Money-Here's Why!, MONDAQ Bus.
BRIEFING, June 11, 2000, available at 2001 WL 8987051 (reporting that the Domain Names Retention
Program developed by PracticalGrowth to evaluate domain names would lead to reducing advertising
costs). According to PracticalGrowth, domain names that "were retained in new media most quickly and
forgotten slowest were names that reminded the listener of traditional media and life experiences." Id.
45 Krieger, supra note 23, at 49 (noting that consumers who guess a company's domain name
may not know what company they have reached until they open the vendor's site and find out who owns
the corresponding web site).
46 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044-45 (9th Cir.
1999) (describing one method in which web users often assume that the domain name of a particular
company will be the company name followed by .com. Using a second method, the web user will guess
a key word to input into a search engine).
47 For example, loans.com received three to four thousand hits per day before Bank of America
purchased the domain, when the web site was inactive. See Joelson, supra note 13, at 1 (reporting the
acquisition of loans.com for $3 million by Bank of America). Business.com received one million unique
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communicate the business of the company to the consumer. In doing so,
they capture the attention of, and facilitate visitation by, the consumer.48
Accordingly, memorable domain names provide advertising and marketing
advantages.4 9 It is no surprise that e-companies are willing to spend large
sums of money for memorable domain names.5 °
II.

DOMAIN NAMES AS PROPERTY UNDER THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS
THEORY

Even though domain names are "things" with value, this does not
mean that they are property. As Justice Holmes observed in his concurring
opinion in InternationalNews Services v. Associated Press:
[Piroperty, a creation of law, does not arise from value.... Many exchangeable values
may be destroyed intentionally without compensation. Property depends upon exclusion
by law from interference, and a person is not excluded from using any combination of
words merely
because someone has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to
51
make it.

In other words, the owner (registered user) of a domain name may
continue to possess the domain name, but the registered user of the domain
name may own no property if the law has not created and granted the regisvisitors in January, 2001. Hans Ibold, Business.com CEO Keeps Faith in Ad-Driven Model, L.A. Bus.
J., Feb. 26, 2001, at 15, available at 2001 WL 10555924 (reporting Business.com paid $7.5 million for
its domain name and the site met its traffic milestones by having one million unique visitors for the
month of January).
48 Black, supra note 23 (quoting Evans Gebhardt, vice president of marketing for the online
travel company cheaptickets.com, that the domain name is "very telegraphic, it indicates saving
money"). Some domain names such as Salary.com are "'self-branding domain[s] because of the strong
mental association that consumers will form in relation to [them]." Id.
49 Johnson, supra note 12, at Al (reporting that companies such as Idealab in Pasadena, California will pay $1 million for domain names, with the belief that the name's marketing power will offset
the overall advertising cost). Mr. Johnson also reported Marketvision's game plan: Secure domain
names first, then develop appropriate businesses around them. Id. Obviously, having the most memorable domain names is only a part of the overall Internet branding. The owner of the domain name must
provide consumers with a pleasant and convenient experience at the site. Black, supra note 23 (quoting
CEO Kent Plunkett of Salary.com that "[a] good domain name will give you an advantage that translates into less spending on marketing. When they get to your site, they then need to have a good user
experience to attribute to your brand.").
50 See Rachael King, What's Wireless.com Worth? Maybe $15M, INTERACTIVE WKLY., Jan. 31,
2000, available at 2000 WL 4064606 (reporting online brand campaigns and dot.com companies'
willingness to pay a large sum of money for memorable domain names); Johnson, supra note 12, at Al
(reporting e-companies paying for memorable domain names to develop their business brand in the
Internet); Froomkin, supra note 20, at 37-38 (noting that domain names' "potential 'friendliness' is also
the source of legal and commercial disputes: businesses have come to view their domain names as an
important identifier, even a brand. And as both businesses and users increasingly have come to view
domain names as having connotations that map to the world outside the Internet, rather than as arbitrary
identifiers, conflicts, often involving claims of trademark infringement or unfair competition, have
become more frequent.").
51 Int'l News Servs. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., concurring).
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tered user certain rights relating to the domain name.52
Commentators often define property as a bundle of rights that includes
the right of possession, the right of use, and the right of alienation. 3 It has
also long been observed that the concept of property is always in transition.54 The bundle of rights today is very different than the bundle of rights
that existed in the early part of the twentieth century.55 Further, the concept
of property is influenced by the states.56 Nevertheless, property law is
primarily concerned with "the relation of individual to community with
regard to use and exploitation of resources."5 7 In this Article, the exploited
resource reflected upon is the predominant Internet resource-Internet domain names.
Under the bundle of rights theory, a domain name is property because
it possesses all three requisite rights. First, the registrant of a domain name
has the right to exert control over the domain name. 8 In fact, her domain
name is unique-no other person or entity can have the same domain name
on the Internet. Second, the registrant has the exclusive right to use the
unique domain name. 59 If she so desires, she can turn her domain name into
6
a brand with a user-friendly web site, fast service, and reliable products. 0
Third, the registrant has the right to alienate or otherwise dispose of the
domain name.6 1 She can assign the domain name to others for financial gain
(or loss). She can sell her domain name to the highest bidder online, using
one of the many auction sites such as GreatDomains.com. If she has gained
ownership of the domain name through fraudulent means, she can be forced

52 Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of Property?A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 604 (1994) (outlining a generic definition of property).
53 Id. at 606.
54 John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (1986).
55 Id. at 1 ("[T]he word property remains the same, but the concept is truly in transition.").
56 Property is defined "in terms of exclusions which individuals can impose or withdraw with
state backing against the rest of society." Felix S. Cohen, Dialogueon Private Property, 9 RUTGERs L.
REV. 357, 378 (1954). "Property interests are not created by the Constitution. They are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
In this Article, the Author uses the words "property" and "property interest" interchangeably.
57 Cribbet, supra note 54, at 3 n.7 (quoting MYRES S. McDOUGAL & DAVID HABER, PROPERTY,
WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 71 (1948)).
58

Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 52, at 606 (listing the first bundle of rights: dominion and

control rights).
59 Id. (listing the second bundle of ights: ight to use).
60 See, e.g., J.T. Westermeier & Jim Halpert, E-commerce Legal Survival Kit, WL 650 PLI/Pat
421, 433 (2001) (observing that in the United States domain names are used as the brand for the website); Froomkin, supra note 20, at 38 (observing the use of domain names as brands); BERNERS-LEE,
supra note 28, at 127-28 (discussing the use of domain names as brands).
61 Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 52, at 606 (listing the third bundle of rights: alienate or dis-

pose).
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to transfer the domain name to the rightful owner.62 If she uses the domain
name in a manner that may give rise to unfair competition, she will be
forced to forfeit a portion of her property right.63 An example of this might
be if she owns the domain name ecards.com and decides to create a web
site to sell electronic greeting cards after observing that the domain name ecards.com has become very successful in the electronic greeting cards business. 64 In sum, the bundle of rights resides in domain names65 and conse66
quently, domain names should be recognized as property.
III. DOMAIN NAMES As TRADEMARKS-INTANGIBLE PROPERTY?

A.

Trademark Law Overview

Legal protection for trademarks has strong roots in the common law.67
Though federal statutes provide national protection for trademarks, the
common law continues to co-exist, thus ensuring protection for trademarks. 68 Generally, a trademark is a word, phrase, logo, device, or design
that functions as a source identifier of the goods or services on which the
trademark is affixed.69 A trademark also distinguishes its associated goods
or services from others. 70 To be qualified as a protectable trademark under
the federal Lanham Act, a trademark must be either inherently distinctive or

62 Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (ordering the defendant
to transfer the domain name to the original owner).
63 Brown, supra note 38 (discussing how the owner of e-cards.com brought a successful litigation
against a Canadian defendant for using ecards.com in violation of unfair competition law).
64 E-cards v. King, No. 99-CV-3726 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2000).
65 Conrad, supra note 6, at 429.
66 Parchomovsky, supra note 31, at 229 (noting that both the court and ICANN apply the principle of property rule protection in solving domain name disputes). "[E]ither the domain name registrant
gets to retain the name, and the trademark owner gets nothing; or, the trademark owner gets the domain
name and the domain-name registrant receives nothing." Id.
67

See generally FRANK . SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING

TO TRADEMARKS (1925) (tracing the common law protection for trademarks); Beverly W. Pattishall,
Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 121 (1978) (reviewing the
development of trademark law in the United States).
68 Unfair competition, palming off, deceptive trade, and business practices are state claims commonly asserted along with federal claims in trademark cases. See Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 149 (2d Cir. 1997) (the burden of proof under a state law unfair competition
claim is similar to the burden of proof under a Lanham Act claim, except that the state claim requires an
additional element of bad faith or intent). See also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1-32 to 1-34 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing state and federal
unfair competition law).
69 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). In addition, the statutory definition of trademarks also includes intent
to use a trademark. The statute requires the person who intends to use a trademark submit an intent to
use application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
70 Id.
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must have acquired distinctiveness through use in commerce. 7'
The general rule regarding distinctiveness is the classic trademark
classification set out by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch.2 Under
the Abercrombie & Fitch classification, arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive
trademarks are automatically protected because their intrinsic nature functions solely to identify the source of the goods. 73 There are no direct relationships between these trademarks and the associated goods. Arbitrary
trademarks are typically common words used randomly in relation to the
goods that the marks affix. 74 Fanciful trademarks are generally coined
words or phrases.7 5 Suggestive trademarks require the use of imagination to
connect the trademarks with the associated goods.76
On the other end of the classification are descriptive and generic
trademarks. Descriptive trademarks are not inherently distinctive because
they describe the quality or characteristic of the associated goods or services.77 Descriptive trademarks are not entitled to protection unless they
have acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning through use in commerce. 7' Generic words, phrases, designs, logos, or devices are never protected under trademark law. 79 It would be anti-competitive to grant a person
the exclusive right to use the name of an article.80 Rather, competitors need
to use the names of articles or generic designs or logos in commerce.8
71 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc. 505 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992).
72 Id. at 773 (affirming the classic trademark classification under Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976)).
73 See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210-11 (2000) (affirming the general rule that arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive trademarks are inherently distinctive).
74 Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting "Black & White"
is an arbitrary trademark for scotch).
75 Id. at 392 (noting "Kodak" is a fanciful, invented trademark).
76 Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting "360 Degree"
is a suggestive trademark for sneakers); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-it, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 609
(7th Cir. 1986) (noting "Business Week" and "Coppertone" are suggestive trademarks); Citibank, N.A.
v. Citibanc Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir. 1984) (affirming the district court's decision
that "Citibank" is a suggestive trademark).
77 Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d, 455, 464 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing descriptive
trademarks).
78 Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co., 254 U.S. 143, 145 (1920) ("Whatever may have been its original
weakness, the [Coca-Cola] mark for years has acquired a secondary significance and has indicated the
plaintiff's product alone."); RFE Indus. v. SPM Corp., 105 F.3d 923, 925 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting the
descriptive trademark "Coca-Cola" has "acquired 'secondary meaning' in the minds of the public")
(quoting Sara Lee, 81 F.3d at 464).
79 Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[The word 'hog' had
become generic as applied to large motorcycles before Harley-Davidson began to make trademark use
of 'HOG' and... Harley-Davidson's attempt to withdraw this use of the word from the public domain
cannot succeed.").
80 CES Publ'g Corp. v. St. Regis Publ'ns, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that allowing trademark protection for generic terms would be like granting the owner of the term a monopoly); In
re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
81 Sunrise Jewelry Mfg. Corp. v. Fred S.A., 175 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 (Fed Cir. 1999) (holding that
trademark registration for cable jewelry design may be canceled if it is generic); Landscape Forms, Inc.
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Generally, trademark law seeks to protect consumers who have come
to associate a trademark with a particular source. 82 In other words, the law
protects consumers from the likelihood of confusion as to the source.83 The
law, however, also protects the owner of a trademark due to the substantial
investment she has devoted to building goodwill in the trademark.' The
owner of a trademark does not really "own" the trademark, rather she has
the right to enjoin others from using a similar trademark that is likely to
cause consumer confusion. She also has the right to exploit her trademark
as a corporate asset in commercial transactions.86 Though she cannot assign
her trademark without its attached goodwill, she can use her trademark as
general intangible collateral to secure an obligation in commercial secured
financing schemes. 87 The law 88treats her trademark as a form of personal
property-intangible property.
v.Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 380 (2d Cir. 1997) ("While trademarking a generic term would
create a monopoly in a necessary word or phrase, granting trade dress protection to an ordinary product
design would create a monopoly in the goods themselves.").
82 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
83 Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (explaining likelihood of confusion test for registered
trademarks); Id. § 1125(a) (explaining likelihood of confusion test for both registered and unregistered
trademark and trade dress).
84 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 163-64.
85 Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindelburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981) ("[T]he 'property right' or protection accorded a trademark owner can only
be understood in the context of trademark law and its purposes. A trademark owner has a property right
only insofar as is necessary to prevent consumer confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner's goods."); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Ha. Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) (discussing trademarks as property rights).
86 Some trademarks have become extremely important corporate assets. For example, the trademark "Marlboro" has been valued at $65 billion. See Russell L. Parr, The Value of Trademarks,Apr. 14,
1994, WL C913 ALI-ABA 229, 235. The trademark "Coca-Cola" has been valued at $24 billion. Industry Calls for Stiffer Enforcement of Anti-Counterfeiting Laws Abroad, 44 PAT. TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. 585, 586 (1992); see also Pamela S. Chestek, Control of Trademarks by the Intellectual
Property Holding Company, 41 IDEA 1, 48 n.9 (2001) (noting that Coca-Cola trademark is valued at
$35 billion).
87 See generally Lee G. Meyer et al., Intellectual Property in Today's FinancingMarket, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 20, 21 (2000) (discussing the use of intellectual property such as trademarks as collateral in secured transactions and how to perfect the security interests in trademark collateral); Judith L.
Church, Intellectual Property Aspects of CorporateAcquisitions, Sept. 21, 2000, WL SFI4 ALI-ABA
323 (discussing trademarks as corporate assets used in secured transactions and perfection of security
interests in trademarks).
88 In re Together Dev. Corp., 227 B.R. 439, 441 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (explaining that Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs secured transactions of personal property such as general
intangibles which trademarks are classified); see also Joseph v. 1200 Valencia, Inc. (In re 199Z, Inc.),
137 B.R. 778, 782-84 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992) (stating that the Uniform Commercial Code governs
perfection of security interests in trademarks); In re Chattanooga Choo-Choo Co., 98 B.R. 792, 802
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1989) (same); In re C.C. & Co., 86 B.R. 485, 485 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (same); In
re Roman Cleanser, 43 B.R. 940, 943 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) (same). See also Ford Motor Co. v.
Great Domains.com, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21301, at *20 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2001) (rejecting
defendants' assertion that trademarks are not property) (citing Fla. Prepaid., 527 U.S. at 673). Trademarks are "property because [the trademark owners] can exclude others from using them," however,
"not all tortious acts committed against a trademark holder's rights 'deprive' the holder of property in a
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Domain Names Within the Trademark Law Framework

Under trademark law, only domain names that function as source identifiers of the goods or services offered at the associated web sites will receive trademark protection. 89 The domain names are capable of distinguishing these associated goods or services from those of other sources. Further,
under the classic trademark classification, only arbitrary, fanciful, or suggestive domain names are entitled to trademark protections.9" Descriptive
domain names will only receive protection if it can be demonstrated that
through years of use and extensive advertising, relevant consumers have
come to associate these descriptive domain names with a source. 9 1 That is
not an easy, given that most domain names have not been in existence long
enough to form such consumer association. 92 Generic domain names, such
as computer.com for computers sold at the corresponding web site, will not
receive trademark protection.9 3
Further, applying the law relating to the use of trademarks in secured
transactions, the owner of arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, or descriptive domain names that have acquired distinctiveness will be able to use these domain names as collateral in commercial transactions. 94 After all, these domain names are protectable trademarks.95 Accordingly, these domain names
are a form of intangible property, like trademarks.9 6 Does it then follow that
a generic domain name or a descriptive domain name that has not acquired
manner that triggers the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Id. See generally Kmart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 485 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1988) ("Trademark law, like contract law, confers private rights,
which are themselves rights of exclusion. It grants the trademark owner a bundle of such rights ....
").
89 Merges, supra note 22, at 2213-14 (observing that a domain name is just another "name, symbol, or device," listed in the Lanham Act's definition of a trademark).
90 Christie L. Branson, Comment, Was $7.5 Million a Good Dealfor Business.com? The Difficulties of ObtainingTrademark Protectionand Registration for Generic and Descriptive Domain Names,
17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 285, 292 (2001) (discussing trademark protection for
domain names).
91 Lowestfare.com LLC v. US Tours & Travel, Inc., Case No. AF-0284 (eResolution Sept. 2000),
available at http://www.eresolution.com/services/dnd/decisions0284.htm (holding "lowestfare" is
descriptive and cannot be protected unless secondary meaning is proven).
92 See Internet Sec. Sys., Inc. v. HLC Enters., Case No. FA 95493 (Nat'l Arbitration Forum Oct.
2000) (holding that the complainant established it has common law trademark rights in its trade name
by showing that it has been using the trade name to identify its company, products and services since
incorporation, and that it uses the trade name to identify itself on its web site. Through such use, the
trade name can obtain sufficient secondary association with the complainant.).
93 Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (holding that "sex" and
"sex.com" are generic terms and such cannot be protected under trademark law).
94 Jonathan C. Krisko, UCC Revised Article 9: Can Domain Names Provide Security for New
Economy Businesses?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1178, 1179 (2001) (noting domain names as collateral in secured transactions).
95 Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (E.D. Va. 1999) (observing that some domain names
consist of protected trademarks and thus enjoy the rights afforded trademarks).
96 Id. (noting that, like trademarks, domain names consisting of protected trademarks possess
property rights).
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distinctiveness is not an intangible property?9 7 An affirmative response to
this question would certainly be contrary to the increase in value of generic
and merely descriptive domain names, and the bundle of rights residing in
such domain names.98 This demonstrates that forcing domain names to fit
within traditional trademark law is not effective, causing a dissonance between valuable generic domain names in the Internet economy, and a lack
of legal protection for such valuable names.9 9 Further, to force trademark
law to protect valuable generic domain names is to destroy the wellestablished trademark jurisprudence."°
IV. DOMAIN NAME: LICENSE, SERVICE CONTRACT RIGHT, OR
INTANGIBLE PROPERTY?

Generally, a potential registrant may enlist the registration services of
numerous registrars on the Internet to acquire a second level domain
name"°'in a particular top level domain name. 102 A registrar is the entity
that processes the information submitted by an applicant, and then assigns
available domain name registrants.'0 3 Until recently, Network Solution Inc.
(NSI),' ° held the exclusive right to assign Internet domain names in the top
97

id. ("[A] domain name that is not a trademark arguably entails only contract, not property

rights.").
98 Kremen, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1174 (holding that domain names are not protected under trademark
law as intangible property).
99 See infra Part V.
100 Glenn Gundersen, War of the Words?, NAT'L L.J., May 1, 2000, at C1 ("[U]sing generic terms
in dot-com names is at odds with a basic of trademark law: such terms can never be protected."); see
generally Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[R]egistration of a domain name for a Web site does not trump long-established principles of trademark law."); Cardservice Int'l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. Va. 1997) (rejecting claim
that domain name registrant who is the junior user of the name acquired special rights by first registering and using Internet domain name).
101 A second level domain name is the word that appears on the left side of the dot (.). It is usually
a trademark, trade name, or the name of the company, institution, product and service. For example, in
the domain name "microsoft.com" the word microsoft is the second level domain name. See, e.g., Sallen
v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining the anatomy of a
domain name and the basics of the Internet).
102 A top level domain generally describes the nature of the company and it is the word that appears on the right side of the dot. Examples of this include ".com" (commercial), ".org" (organization),
and ".gov" (government). See e.g., Sallen, 273 F.3d at 19; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1043.
103 See generally Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(discussing the responsibilities of a domain name registrar); Registrar Accreditation Agreement of May
17, 2001 (definition of registrar), at http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement-17may0l.htm.
104 Through its contract with the National Science Foundation, NSI was the exclusive registrar of
the second level domain names .com, .org, .net, and .edu until 1999. Smith v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
135 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1161 (N.D. Ala. 2001). In June, 1999, five companies in addition to NSI began
providing competing domain name registration services. Id. There are now more than eighty domain
name registrars. Id. See also Register.com, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242 n.1 ("[NSI] formerly enjoyed a
monopoly as the only domain name register. NSI still operates and maintains the top-level domain name
servers and zone files which enable the other registrars to access the DNS (Domain Name System) and
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'' 5
level domain names such as ".com, . gov" .org," .net," and ".edu.
New top level domain names such as ".biz," ".museum," ".pro," ".info,"
".name," ".aero," and ".coop" were approved by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned names and Numbers (ICANN) on November 16, 2000 to reduce the domain name scarcity problem.1 °6 The potential registrant can
register her domain name for a fixed period of time, 10 7 and later renew the
registration before it expires. 0 8

A.

Domain Names as Licenses

The registration of a domain name seems to suggest that a domain name
is a license. 1°9 The effect of registration is that it grants the registrant the
privilege to use the domain name for a period of time agreed upon by the
registrant and the registrar at the time of registration.' l0 The privilege to use
the domain name expires if it is not renewed.' 1 ' If a domain name were a
license, it would imply that some interests existed before the registration of
the name.1 12 Further, if a domain name were a license, the registrar would
be the licensor and the registrant the licensee. That implies the licensor has
the ownership or rights in the domain name before the licensor enters into a
license agreement allowing the licensee (registrant) the privilege to use the
domain name for a fixed duration. This analysis, however, contradicts the
fact that registrars do not own or possess interests in domain names. " 3 Registrars are under contractual obligation with ICANN to register domain
to transmit domain name registration information for the .com, .net, and .org top level domain names to
the [Internet Domain Name] System.").
105 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
("Under a contract with the National Science Foundation, NSI manages domain name registrations for
the ".com, " net, .org," ".edu," and ".gov" top-level domains."). See also Watts v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1999 WL 778589, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 7, 1999) (noting NSI was responsible for domain
name registrations pursuant to a contract with the National Science Foundation effective January 1,
1993); Worldsport Networks Ltd. v. Artinternet, S.A., 1999 WL 269719, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1999)
(same); Beverly v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1998 WL 320829, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 1998).
106 ICANN, New TLD Program, http://www.icann.org/tlds. See also Dina ElBoghdady, DotWhat? Decision Near After Rancorous Debate on New Internet Suffixes, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2000, at
El, available at 2000 WL 25428230 (reporting the controversial process of selecting new top level
domains).
107 NSI and Register.corn offer registration for the initial period of one, two, five, and ten years.
See http://www.networksolution.com (NSI provides discounted registration for multiple years);
http://www.register.com/ pricing.cgi?1129706108811.
108 Registrants must pay renewal fees to the registrar in order keep the domain name registration.
See http://www.netsol.com/enUS/manage-it/renewal-check-name.jhtml;
http://www.register.coml
renew.cgi? 1129706108811.
109 Conrad, supra note 6, at 430.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, http://www.icann.org/registrars/ra-agreement17may0l.htm, at § 3 (Registrar Obligations).
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names, and a domain name does not exist until the name is registered.1 14
B.

Domain Names as Service ContractRights

It is also possible to classify domain names as service contract rights.
An analysis of the formation of domain names reveals that domain names
are products of a service contract between a domain name registrant and a
registrar such as NSI. 1'5 For example, if a person wishes to obtain a domain
name from NSI, she needs to submit her proposed domain name to be registered at the website of the registrar.' 16 The registrar will conduct a search
to ascertain whether the requested domain name is still available. 17 The
registrar then matches the available domain name with the corresponding
Internet Protocol number for the desired Internet site.118 The registrar maintains a directory of domain name servers."1 9 The servers connect domain
names with Internet resources such as Web sites and e-mail systems. 120 For
a small fee, the registrar registers the domain name, and renews the
registration as long as the renewal fee is paid. 12 ' The registrant agrees to be
bound by the Domain Name Dispute Policy as approved by ICANN on
October 24, 1999.122 Further, the registrant makes certain representations
114

Under the Registrar Obligations, the registrar must provide Registrar Services. "'Registrar

Services' means services provided by a registrar in connection with a TLD when it has an agreement
with the TLD's Registry Operator, and includes contracting with Registered Name Holders, collecting
registration data about the Registered Name Holders, and submitting registration information for entry
in the Registry Database." ICANN, Registrar Accreditation Agreement, http://www.icann.org/ registrars/ra-agreement-17mayOl.htm, at § 1.11.
115 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't, 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir 1999);
Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aftd, 194
F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (explaining NSI's role in the domain name system); Network Solutions, Inc. v.
Umbro, Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 86 (Va. 2000).
116 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1044.
117 Id.; Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at953.
118 Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 953 ("NSI performs two functions in the domain name
system. First, it screens domain name applications against its registry to prevent repeated registrations
of the same name. Second, it maintains a directory linking domain names with the IP numbers of domain name servers. The domain name servers, which are outside of NSI's control, connect domain
names with Internet resources such as Web sites and e-mail systems.").
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Domain Registrar Agreement
4, http://myhosting.com/NSI-Agreement.htm (Fees, Payment
and Term of Service) ("As consideration for the services you have selected, you agree to pay Network
Solutions the applicable service(s) fees set forth on our Web site at the time of your selection. All fees
are due immediately and are non-refundable.... Unless otherwise specified, each Network Solutions'
service is for a two-year initial term and renewable in perpetuity thereafter for successive one-year
terms. Any renewal of your services with us is subject to our then current terms and conditions and
payment of all applicable service fees at the time of renewal.") (last visited Aug. 9, 2001).
122 Id. 8 (Domain Name Dispute Policy) ("[Ylou agree to be bound by our current domain name
dispute policy that is incorporated herein and made a part of this Agreement by reference. The current
version of the dispute policy may be found at our Web site: http://www.networksolutions.com/
enUS/legal/dispute-policy.html. Please take the time to familiarize yourself with that policy.").
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about her right to use the domain name and that her use is not
interfering with other entities' rights.1 23 As long as the registrant maintains
her representations, the registrar continues to provide the services pursuant
to a domain name service contract agreement. 124 Not surprisingly, a number
of courts have held that domain names are not personal property, but are
service contract rights.
In Network Solutions Inc. v. Umbro International,Umbro, a judgment
creditor, sought to garnish several domain names that were registered by
the judgment debtor, a Canadian corporation, with the garnishee, Network
Solutions, Inc., in satisfaction of a default judgment. 2 5 Prior to the garnishment proceeding, Umbro obtained a default judgment against the
judgment debtor for registration of the domain name "umbro.com" in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. 26 The district court permanently enjoined the judgment debtor from further use of
the domain name umbro.com, and awarded Umbro a judgment of
$23,489.98 for attorneys' fees and expenses. Umbro subsequently obtained
a writ of fierifacias from the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia and
27
instituted a garnishment proceeding. 1
In the garnishment proceeding, Umbro named NSI as the garnishee
and sought to garnish thirty-eight domain names that the judgment debtor
had registered with NSI. 128 Umbro requested that NSI deposit the domain
names with the court. 29 NSI asserted that it held no garnishable property
belonging to the judgment debtor because domain names are "standardized,
executory service contracts" that cannot function on the Internet in the absence of certain services provided by NSI.130 Moreover, domain name services do not have a readily ascertainable value.' 3 ' Thus, the writ of fieri
facias does not attach to the judgment debtor's contractual rights that are
dependent on unperformed conditions such as NSI's rights to indemnification and the registrant's continuing obligation to maintain an accurate regis132
tration record.
The court found that the judgment debtor had a possessory interest in
the domain names registered with NSI. 13 3 Specifically, there were no unperformed conditions with regard to the judgment debtor's contractual rights
123 Id. 5 (Accurate Information); Id. 17 (Representations and Warranties).
124 Id. 17.
125 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 81 (Va. 2000).
126 Id.
127 Id.

128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id.
Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id.
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to use the domain names, and NSI would not be forced to perform services
for entities with whom it does not desire to do business.' 34 The court concluded that domain names are valuable intangible property subject to garnishment, ordered NSI to deposit control of the domain names with the
court, and directed the sheriffs office to sell the domain names to successful bidders. 35 NSI appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision,
and held that domain names are not gamishable because the right to their
36
use is inextricably bound to the domain name services NSI provides.
Essentially, the rights possessed by the judgment debtor in the domain
names at issue do not exist separate and apart from NSI's services that
make the domain names operational Internet addresses. 137 The court concluded that a domain name is the product of a contract for services between
the registrar and registrant, and is not a "liability" on a third person to the
38
judgment debtor pursuant to the Virginia statutes for garnishment.
In reaching its decision, the court was concerned that allowing the
garnishment of NSI's services created by contractual right to use a domain
name would open the door for garnishment of any service. 139 This concern,
however, clouds the court's analysis. The court ignored the fact that NSI
had acknowledged that the right to use a domain name is a form of intangible personal property. Also, Congress recently passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act which contains an in rem remedy against
domain names, further supporting the position that domain names are intangible property."4 The Virginia Supreme Court insisted that the NSI's
acknowledgement and congressional action were not essential to the outcome of the case because they do not address "the relationship between an
operational Internet domain name and its attendant services provided by a
' 141
registrar."
The Umbro majority erroneously rested its holding on a comment in
Dorerv. Arel that "a domain name registration is the product of a contract

134
135

Id.

Id.
Id. at 86.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 85-86. The Umbro majority noted that "a judgment creditor can institute garnishment
proceedings if 'there is a liability' on a third person to the judgment debtor. 'Liability' in this context
means a 'legal obligation,' 'enforceable by civil remedy,' a financial or pecuniary obligation,' or a
'debt."' Id. at 85 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 925 (7th ed. 1999)). Further, the successful judgment creditor "stands upon no higher ground than the judgment debtor and can acquire no greater right
than such debtor possesses." Id.
139 Id. at 86-87.
140 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-3010, 113
Stat. 1501.
141 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 n.12.
136
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for services between the registrar and registrant.' 4 2 Had the Umbro court
read the Dorer decision with care, it would have discovered that the Dorer
court acknowledged that some domain names exist even without attached
goodwill, and that they are attractive and appropriate targets for judgment
creditors seeking to satisfy a judgment from a debtor. 143 Moreover, the
Dorer court left undecided the question of whether domain names are property or merely contract rights.'44
Factually, in Dorer v. Arel, the plaintiff trademark holder obtained a
default judgment against the defendant infringer for using the phrase "Write
Word Publications" and the domain name "writeword.com" in the course of
its business. 4 5 A permanent injunction and damages in the amount of
$5,000 were entered in plaintiff's favor.' 46 To satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiff sought a writ of fieri facias to execute on the infringer's domain
name. 147
The district court noted that under Virginia law, "on motion of a
judgment creditor, the clerk of the court issues a writ of fierifacias, which
writ orders an appropriate officer to satisfy the judgment out of the judgment debtor's personal property."' 148 The officer has the authority to sell
any property of the judgment debtor and collect any debts owed the judgment creditor to which the lien applies.' 49 The court observed, however,
that there is no statutory provision for direct transfer of the judgment
150
debtor's property to the judgment creditor in satisfaction of the judgment.
"And where a third party controls the property subject to the writ, a judgment creditor typically must follow garnishment procedure under Virginia
15 1
law."'
Thus, under Virginia law, it is unclear whether the writ of fierifacias
is operative on domain names.'5 2 This question was one of first impression
to the court.' 5 3 The court observed that there are several reasons to doubt
that domain names should be treated as personal property subject to judgment liens. 5 4 Since a domain name may consist of a protected trademark,
the court first looked to trademark law for guidance. 55 The court noted that
142 Id. (quoting Dorer v. Abel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999)).
143 Dorer,60 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
144 Id. at 562.
145

Id. at 558.

146 Id.
147 Id. at 559.
148

Id.

149 Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-510 (Michie 2001)).
150 Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511 (Michie 2001)).
151
152

Id.

153
154

Id. at 560.

Id.

Id.
155 Id. at 560-61.
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trademarks are "not assets that can be freely traded apart from the goodwill
to which they attached,"' 56 and that "a judgment creditor may not levy upon
and sell a judgment debtor's registered service mark or trademark."' 57
Thus, creditors may not place a lien on trademarked domain names.
In addition, a domain name that is not protected under traditional
trademark law entails only contract, and not property rights, because a domain name is "the product of a contract for services between the registrar
and registrant. ' The court observed that "the contracted-for service produces benefit and value depending upon how the party receiving the service
exploits it."' 59 This contracted service is similar to "owning" a telephone
number."6 It has the potential for commercial exploits that may generate
high monetary value for the registrant.' 6' For example, like a phone number, a domain name may become valuable because the registrant uses it in
association with a web site that is user-friendly, full of desired information,
contains sought after products, and attracts a million hits per day.' 62 Thus,
the value of the domain name depends on how it is used by the registrant or
party who has the right to use it.' 63 Consequently, a domain name existing
apart from the value or goodwill added by the user is not valuable." 4 Thus,
"if the only value that comes from transfer of the domain name is from the
value added by the user, it is inappropriate to consider that [the domain
156 Id.at 561.
157 Id. (quoting 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 160 (1994)). In
addition, the court, in a footnote, rejected an analogy that a domain name is like a patent because a
derives its value chiefly from its manner of use, typically as a trade
domain name is an address and "it
name or trademark." Id. at 561 n.9. Further, it was unclear to the court whether patents are subject to a
judgment lien under Virginia law. Id.
158 Id. at 561.
159 Id.
160 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (comparing domain
name to 1-800-HOLIDAY); Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (drawing an analogy between domain names
and telephone numbers); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 957-58
(C.D. Cal. 1997) (analogizing domain names as having functionality similar to telephone numbers); but
see Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584-85 (2d Cir. 2000) (warning against
the adoption of the analogy between domain names and telephone number mnemonics because "the
nature of domain names is not susceptible to such a uniform, monolithic characterization [and it is]
'unwise and unnecessary definitively to pick one analogy or one specific set of words now"') (quoting
Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996) (Breyer, J., plurality)). See also Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting both
technical function and commercial use of domain names).
161 Dorer, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 561 n.13 (recognizing "I-800-COLLECT" and "I-800-FLOWERS"
as two extremely valuable commercial tools); Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 958 ("Domain names,
like telephone numbers, are also valuable to trademark holders when they make it easier for customers
to find the trademark holder. Where the holder of a vanity telephone number promotes it in a way that
causes a likelihood of confusion, the holder has engaged in an infringing use.").
162 Dorer, 60 F. Supp. at 561; Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 958 ("A toll-free telephone number with an easy-to-remember letter equivalent is a valuable business asset.").
163 Dorer,60 F. Supp. at 561.
164 Id.
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name is] an element subject to execution."' 65
The Dorer court also noted that some domain names are valuable irrespective of any goodwill that might be attached to them. 166 The court acknowledged that these domain names are generic or clever and they are
"extremely valuable to Internet entrepreneurs.' 6 7 Such domain names can
be "freely transferred apart from their content.' 68 Accordingly, domain
names with significant value would be "attractive" and "appropriate" targets for a judgment creditor seeking to satisfy a judgment from a debtor.169
With that acknowledgement, the court concluded that whether a domain name is personal property subject to the lien of fieri facias is a
"knotty issue" and declined to decide that question. The court deferred the
writ, stating that the registrar provided an alternative means through which
170
the plaintiff could use the judgment to acquire the domain name.
C.

Domain Names as Intangible Property

The decisions in Umbro and Dorer fail to correctly classify domain
names. The courts overlooked the cyberspace, networked medium of ecommerce, and that memorable domain names have become valuable, exchangeable commodities in the open market. Many domain names command substantially high price tags because they have the capability of generating more traffic to a particular web site. Further, domain names are
unique and scarce Internet resources.171 The feverish speculation concerning generic or descriptive domain names decreases the availability of such
domain names in the primary market and drives the price of such domain
names in the secondary market. In addition, not only are domain names
transferable in the open market, they are transferable by court order,'7 2 or
by panels authorized by ICANN in domain name disputes. 173 Domain
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168
169

Id.
Id.

170 The Dorer court referred to the NSI's procedure to resolve domain name disputes. Id
171 BERNERS-LEE, supra note 28, at 128 (the founder of the World Wide Web stated that domain
names are scarce and irreplaceable resources).
172 Washington Speakers Bureau, Inc. v. Leading Authorities, Inc., 2000 WL 825881, at *1 (4th
Cir. June 27, 2000); Harrods Ltd v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 680-81 (E.D.
Va. 2001) (ordering NSI to transfer fifty-four domain names to plaintiff); Jack In The Box, Inc. v.
Jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d 590 (E.D. Va. 2001) (entering default judgment for the plaintiff and
ordering the domain names jackinthebox.org and jackinthebox.net be transferred to the plaintiff);
Broadbridge Media v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet
Dimensions, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1628 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Diller v. Steurken, 712 N.Y.S.2d 311,
316 (2000).
173 ICANN's authorized panels have disposed by decision 4139 proceedings involving 7236
domain names. They ordered transfers of 5650 domain names from the registrants to owners of protect-
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names are intangible property, since, after all, "property includes 'everything which one person can own and transfer to another. It extends to every
enjoyed as such upon which it
species of right and interest capable of' being
174
is practicable to place a money value. ,
Indeed, a California court in Kremen v. Cohen recognized the property
interest in domain names and departed from the judicial dissonance espoused by Umbro and Dorer. In Kremen v. Cohen, the plaintiff asserted a
claim of conversion and conspiracy to convert property against the registrar, NSI. 175 Plaintiff registered sex.com with NSI. Defendant fraudulently
requested NSI to transfer sex.com to defendant. 176 Plaintiff sued NSI for
transferring the domain name to defendant. NSI moved for summary judgthe claim that a domain name is not
ment on several grounds, including 77
property capable of being converted. 1
The court noted that historically, the tort of conversion was confined
to tangible property. 178 California law expanded the common law rule and
the tort now reaches intangible property merged in or identified with some
documents, such as bonds, notes, bills of exchange, stock certificates, and
warehouse receipts. 7 9 Intangible property such as goodwill of business,
trade secrets, a newspaper route, or a customer list are not subject to conversion. 180 Accordingly, under California tort of conversion law, the domain name sex.com is not protected intangible property because it is not
merged in or identified with a document or other tangible object.' 8 '
The court, nevertheless, held that domain names are intangible prop182
erty.
The court rejected the Umbro majority's position that domain
names are products of service contracts between the registrar and the registrant. 183 The court found that the dissent's argument in Umbro had merit,
that the right to use domain names "exists separate and apart from NSI's
various services that make the domain names operational Internet addresses. These services... are mere conditions subsequent.... 84
able trademarks or personal names. ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.orgludrp/proceedings-stat.htm (updated daily)
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
174 Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (quoting Yuba River
Power Co. v. Nev. Irrigation Dist., 279 P. 128, 129 (Cal. 1929)).
175 Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1170-71 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
176 Id. at 1170.
177 Id. at 1171-74.
178

Id. at 1173.

179 Id. at 1172.
180

Id.

181

Id. at 1173.

182

Id.

183 Id. at 1173 n.2 (noting the Umbro majority's concern was primarily with the use of domain
names in garnishment proceedings, and thus the decision is "superficially appealing" to the issue of
correct classification of domain names).
184 Id. (quoting Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 89 (Va. 2000) (Comp-
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Moreover, in a subsequent opinion, the Kremen court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and confirmed that domain names
are intangible property.'8 5 Since a domain name provides rights and interests capable of being enjoyed by the registrant, and monetary value can be
placed on the domain name, a domain name is intangible property under
California law.' 86 Accordingly, the court ordered the defendant to transfer
the domain name sex.com to the plaintiff, as original owner.'8 7 The defendant argued that it had title to the sex.com domain name based on a letter
from plaintiffs officer. 188 The court found that the letter was forged.' 89
Thus, the transfer of the domain name from the plaintiff to the defendant
was void ab initio, and the rule that forgery constituted a nullity applies to
the transfer of domain names just as with other interests in property.' 90
The Kremen decision is sound in its analysis and reasoning on the
proper classification of domain names, particularly in regard to generic or
descriptive domain names that are not protected by trademark law, and yet
are valuable on the Internet even without the attached goodwill. These domain names are freely assignable and transferable.' 91 Moreover, the Kremen analysis is consistent with the traditional bundle of rights property
theory. The owner of a domain name has the right to exert control over the
domain name, the exclusive right to use the domain name, and the right to
alienate the domain name. 192 Consequently, domain names should be recognized as property, or more precisely, intangible property.
V.

SOME DOMAIN NAMES ARE PROPERTY, OTHERS ARE NOT?

The Internet and the rapid changes in e-commerce precipitate another
dissonance that both Congress and the courts actively nurtured. The dissonance is currently unfolding following the passage of the Anticybersquatton, J., dissenting)).
185 Kremen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *3 ("[Plroperty includes 'everything which one person can own
and transfer to another and extends to every species of right and interest capable of being enjoyed as
such upon which it is practicable to place a money value."') (quoting Yuba River, 279 P. at 129); Id.
("In a court of equity if that which complainant has acquired fairly at substantial cost may be sold fairly
at substantial profit, a competitor who is misappropriating it for the purposes of disposing of it to his
own profit and to the disadvantage of complainant cannot be heard to say that it is too fugitive or evanescent to be regarded as property.") (quoting McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32, 34 (Cal. Ct. App.
1952)).
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id.at *1-2.
Id.at *34.
Dorer v. Abel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 561 (E.D. Va. 1999).
See supra Part II. See also Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 19 (1st

Cir. 2001) (noting domain name registrant acquires "exclusive rights to that second level domain and
the ability to create as many third (or higher) level domains as desired under that second level domain").
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ting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) and decisions interpreting the
ACPA. 93 Both Congress and the courts recognize that domain names play
a very important role in e-commerce, and consequently decided that domain names should be treated as property. 194 An analysis of the relevant
statutory and decisional law, however, reveals that both Congress and the
courts have created two groups of domain names; some are property, others
are not. A review of the anticybersquatting statute is necessary to understand the dissonance on legal classification of domain names.
A.

Legislative Background of the ACPA

Cybersquatting is "the Internet version of a land grab." 195 Cybersquatting is profitable "because while it is inexpensive for a cybersquatter to
register the mark of an established company as a domain name, such companies are often vulnerable to being forced into paying substantial sums to
get their names back." 96 Congress defined cybersquatting activities as "bad
faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet domain names
with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such marks." 97
Cybersquatters outsmarted existing federal trademark dilution and infringement laws, shielding themselves in cyberspace from prosecution or
liability for their conduct.'98 Specifically, cybersquatters invented new
ways of trafficking domain names for profit and holding domain names
hostage at the expense of trademark owners, all carefully crafted to avoid
any liability under trademark law. 1 9 Congress denounced cybersquatting or
193 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D.
Va. 2000); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000).
194 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) (in rem provision against unauthorized registrations of domain
names).
195 Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001).
196 Id.
197 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999). See also Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market, Inc.,
202 F.3d 489, 495-96 (2d Cir. 2000) (defining cybersquatting as activity where a non-trademark holder
registers well-known domain names solely for the purpose of selling the names back to the original
trademark owners).
198 Indeed, the Senate expressed its view on this issue:
While the [FTDA] has been useful in pursuing cybersquatters, cybersquatters
have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has developed and now
take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from liability. For example,
many cybersquatters are now careful to no longer offer the domain name for sale
in any manner that could implicate liability under existing trademark dilution
case law. And, in cases of warehousing and trafficking in domain names, courts
have sometimes declined to provide assistance to trademark holders, leaving
them without adequate and effective judicial remedies. This uncertainty as to the
trademark law's application to the Internet has produced inconsistent judicial decisions and created extensive monitoring obligations, unnecessary legal costs,
and uncertainty for consumers and trademark owners alike.
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 7; See also Sporty's Farm,202 F.3d at 495 (quoting S. REP.NO. 106-140, at 7).
199 S. REP. No. 106-140. at 7.
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cyberpiracy activities committed by individuals seeking extortionate profits
by registering and reserving Internet domain names that are similar or identical to protectable trademarks without any intent to use the domain names
in commerce themselves.2 °° Such actions threaten "the continued growth
and vitality of the Internet as a platform ...for communication, electronic
commerce, education, entertainment, and countless other yet-to-be determined uses.""'' Such actions also undermine consumer confidence in the
Internet economy, discourage consumer use of the Internet, and destroy the
value and goodwill of brand names and trademarks." 2 The Senate Committee Report condemned cyberpiracy because it deprives trademark owners of
revenues derived from and goodwill associated with their trademarks and
imposes an enormous burden on trademark owners to protect and police
their trademarks on the Internet. 0 3 Further, cyberpiracy causes consumer
confusion as to the source of goods and services on the Internet and impairs
the growth of electronic commerce.2 °4
In response to the failure of traditional trademark infringement law
and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995205 to curb the proliferation
of cybersquatting activities on the Internet, Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,2' 6 and on November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed into law an omnibus budget bill that included the
ACPA. 20 7 The ACPA amends the Trademark Act of 1946 (the Lanham
Act), adding a new cause of action to section 43 of the Act 20 8 and providing
200 Hartog & Co. AS v. SWIX.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (E.D. Va. 2001) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 106-412 (1999)).
201 Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 8).
202 Hartog, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
203 Congress stated that cyberpiracy "harms the public by causing consumer fraud and public
confusion as to the true source or sponsorship of goods or services, by impairing electronic commerce,
by depriving trademark owners of substantial revenues and consumer goodwill, and by placing unreasonable, intolerable, and overwhelming burdens on trademark owners in protecting their own marks." S.
REP. No. 106-140, at 12 (1999); see also id. at 7.
204 See supranote 202.
205 Virtual Works, 238 F.3d at 267 (acknowledging the need for new legislation to address cybersquatting problem because "then-current law did not expressly prohibit the act of cybersquatting").
206 On June 21, 1999, Senator Spencer Abraham (R-MI) introduced the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. S. 1255, 106th Cong. (1999). On July 29, 1999, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
introduced the Domain Name Piracy Prevention Act of 1999. S.1461, 106th Cong. (1999). On August
5, 1999, the Senate passed S. 1255, which was amended to incorporate S.1461. On October 26, 1999,
an amended version of that bill passed the House in lieu of the House's own version that was introduced
earlier by Representative James Rogan (R-CA). Congress then incorporated the legislation into its
omnibus spending bill. H.R. 3194, 106th Cong. (1999). President Clinton signed the bill into law on
November 29, 1999. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§
3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1501.
207 S.REP. No. 106-140 (1999).
208 The new section 43(d) is the ACPA. Section 43(c) is the codified FrDA. Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act is generally applied in trademark infringement and unfair competition cases. 15 U.S.C. §§
1125(a). (c). (d).
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a specific federal remedy against bad faith domain name registrations. 20 9
B.

In rem JurisdictionalGrant

Because the Internet has no physical boundaries, a person who resides
in California 2 °Canada, 211 or the Dominican Republic2 12can register a domain name with a registrar in Virginia through digital contact with the click
of a mouse.213 As foreign registrants, cybersquatters elude trademark enforcement because it is impossible to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
them.2 14 To remain anonymous on the Internet, cybersquatters often provide
false information to the registrar of domain names, and thus cannot be
found.215 This creates a problem for trademark owners who want to initiate
a legal action against such elusive cybersquatters.216 To solve this problem,
Congress included an in rem provision in the ACPA.
Under the in rem provision, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the domain name was registered in bad faith.217 In addition, the plaintiff must
establish that it owns a protectable trademark, which is a trademark that is
either distinctive or famous. 218 In the case of a distinctive trademark, the
owner must prove that the domain name was either identical or confusingly
209

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). Hartog & Co. AS v. SWIX.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 536 (E.D. Va.

2001) ("The primary purpose of the ACPA is to eliminate a practice which has become known as 'cybersquatting' or 'cyberpiracy,' by 'individuals seeking extortionate profits by reserving Internet domain
names that are similar or identical to trademarked names with no intention of using the names in commerce themselves. Such actions undermine consumer confidence, discourage consumer use of the
Internet, and destroy the value of brand-names and trademarks of American business."'). Id. (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 106-412 (1999)).
210 Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 849 (E.D. Va. 2000). The domain name
registrant in Huang was a California corporation with its principal place of business in Taiwan. Id.
211 Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 861 (E.D. Va. 2000). In
Heathmount, the domain name registrant resided in Ontario, Canada. Id.
212 Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane v. Casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Supp. 2d 340, 341 (E.D. Va. 2001).
In Alitalia-Linee, the domain name registrant resided in the Dominican Republic, conducted its business
entirely outside of the Untied States, and had no presence in the United States).
213 Kindel, supra note 3, at 2105 (noting electronic contact with forum state and questioning
whether courts can exercise jurisdiction based on such contact).
214 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp.
2d 658 (E.D. Va. 2001) (in rem action against sixty domain names because the registrant is domiciled in
Argentina).
215 S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999) ("A significant problem faced by trademark owners in the
fight against cybersquatting is the fact that many cybersquatters register domain names under alias or
otherwise provide false information in their registration applications in order to avoid identification and
service of process by the mark owner.").
216 Id.
217 Harrods, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 664 (holding that to bring an in rem action against the domain
names, the plaintiff must show that the domain names were registered in bath faith).
218 Id. at 668 (finding the "Harrods" trademark is entitled to protection under the ACPA because
the trademark is "distinctive"); Id. at 669 n.18 (finding the "Harrods" trademark is "famous" under the
ACPA by evaluating the length of use, the extent of use, diverse channel of trade, and consumer recognition survey evidence).
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similar to the distinctive mark 219 at the time the domain name was registered.22 ° In the case of a famous trademark, the owner of the trademark
must prove that the domain name was identical to, confusingly similar to,
or dilutive of the famous mark22 ' at the time the domain name was registered.22 2
Under the in rem provision, in order to determine the situs of a domain
name, courts look to where the domain name registrar, registry, or other
domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located.223 In other words, to litigate over a domain name, a trademark owner
can initiate an in rem action in the judicial district of the domain name registrar, registry, or other domain name authority. 224 For example, if the domain name registrar is NSI, which is headquartered in Herndon, Virginia,
the appropriate judicial district for the in rem litigation would be the Eastern District of Virginia. 225
Accordingly, trademark owners can take advantage of the broad remedy available under the ACPA by electing to assert an in rem action against
the domain name when in personam jurisdiction is not available.226 This
219

The ACPA distinguishes between distinctive and famous marks by specifying different liability

for distinctive and famous marks. Cello Holdings, L.L.C. v. Lawrence-Dahl Cos., 89 F. Supp. 2d 464,
472 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); see also Hartog & Co. AS v. Swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531, 537-39 (E.D. Va.
2001) (analyzing the criteria of "identical or confusingly similar to" distinctive trademark and "dilutive"
to famous trademark in in personam and in rem cases).
220 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
221 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (holding defendant's domain name ernestandjuliogallo.com was confusingly similar to plaintiffs distinctive
and famous trademark Ernest & Julio Gallo in violation of the ACPA and awarding plaintiff $25,000 in
statutory damages).
222 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
223 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) provides "The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action
against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located ...." See
also Cable News Network L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484, 492 (E.D. Va. 2001)
(holding the in rem action is proper because the registry for cnnews.com is located within the judicial
district).
224 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
225 See, e.g., Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121, 135 (D.
Mass. 2001) (dismissing the action for lack of jurisdiction in an in rem action where the registrant
resides outside the United States and the registrar is NSI, but the plaintiff brought the action in the
District Court of Massachusetts). Because NSL until recently, held the exclusive power in registering
domain names in the most coveted top domain name ".com", the majority of in rem cases will be
brought in the Eastern District of Virginia. This will result in a formation of a geographically exclusive
in rem court. Consequently, the formation of in rem jurisprudence is dictated by one court. Cable News
Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492 ("[B]ecause Verisign serves as the registry for all '.com' domain
names ... and controls the entries in the root zone file for the '.com' top level domain, it is able to
transfer control of a domain name.... Because Verisign is located within [the Eastern District of Virginia] and has control over the cnnews.com domain name, in rem jurisdiction in this case is therefore
constitutional.")
226 The in rem provision provides:
The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action against a domain name in the
judicial district in which the domain name registrar, domain name registry, or
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extraordinary relief allows a successful plaintiff to get the domain name
transferred to it, or obtain a cancellation or forfeiture of the domain
name, 22728at very little litigation cost and in a rather short period of time.228
Moreover, the inclusion of in rem jurisdiction provides courts with the
ammunition to declare that domain names are property as prescribed by the
ACPA.
Indeed, a number of district courts have summarily held that domain
names are property for purposes of in rem actions under the ACPA solely
because Congress has declared that domain names are property. 229 For example, in Cable News Network v. cnnews.com, the court held that domain
other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is located if-the domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office, or protected under subsection (a) and (c); and
the court finds that the owner-is not able to obtain in personam jurisdiction over
a person who would have been a defendant and in a civil action under paragraph
(1); or through due diligence was not able to find a person who would have been
a defendant in a civil action under paragraph (1) by-(aa) sending a notice of the
alleged violation and intent to proceed under this paragraph to the registrant of
the domain name at the postal and e-mail address provided by the registrant to
the registrar; and (bb) publishing notice of the action as the court may direct
promptly after filing the action.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
227 Id. § 1125 (d)(2)(D)(i). Procedurally, the trademark owner must deliver a file stamped copy of
the complaint to the registrar. The registrar then freezes the domain name, except to transfer or cancel as
ordered by the court. The registrar must also deposit the domain name with the court. The court can
only grant injunctive relief in the form of a forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer of the domain name. The
relief under an in rem action is limited compared to cases in which the courts have in personamjurisdiction. In such cases, courts have the authority to "order the forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name
or the transfer of the domain name to the owner of the mark," if the domain name was "registered before, on, or after" November 29, 1999. See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, §§ 3001-3010, 113 Stat. 1501. See also Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market,
Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 500 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that, under the ACPA, damages can be awarded for
violations of the Act, but that they are not "available with respect to the registration, trafficking, or use
of a domain name that occurs before the date of the enactment of this Act"). Id. Though the ACPA
limits injunctive remedy to domain names registered before the enactment date, it provides both injunctive relief and damages against all infringing or diluting domain names registered after the enactment
date. Id. (holding that damages were available because the domain name sportys.com was registered
prior to the passage of the ACPA); See also Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing
Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 141, 258 (2001) (stating that the broader remedies available under the ACPA encourage
trademark holders to litigate in courts); Justin T. Toth, Fighting Back on the Internet: A Primer on the
Anticybersquatting Consumer ProtectionAct, UTAH B.J., Nov. 2001, at 18, 22 (discussing the remedies
available under the ACPA).
228 Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("In
many cybersquatting cases, the plaintiff will not desire relief in the form of damages. Quite often, the
plaintiff will seek only to rend an infringing or dilutive domain name from its current owner. For such a
plaintiff, the in rem proceeding is highly preferable to the in personam proceeding because the former is
likely to be quicker and less costly while equally as effective in terms of fulfilling the plaintiff's objectives.").
229 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000); Caesars
World, Inc. v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502, 504 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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names are property and have situs in the judicial district where the registrar
is located. 23" The plaintiff brought an in rem proceeding against a domain
name registered by a Chinese company with Network Solutions, Inc. 231 The
court adopted its ruling from an earlier decision 232 where the defendant
argued that a domain cannot serve as a res because it is merely data that
forms part of an Internet addressing computer protocol.233 According to the
court, "even if a domain name is no more than data, Congress can make
data property and assign its place of registration as its situs. '234 Therefore,
the situs for the domain name at issue is the judicial district of the Eastern
District of Virginia where the domain name registrar and its registry are
located.2 35
With the constitutional challenge being brushed aside, trademark owners have utilized the in rem provision under the ACPA against domain
names. 236 Courts have rewarded successful plaintiffs with domain names by
ordering the transfer of the domain names to plaintiffs who are not the
original domain name owners, but are instead the owners of protectable
trademarks that are entitled to protection under the ACPA.237
The problem with the ACPA and subsequent judicial decisions upholding in rem actions against domain names is the disparate treatment of
domain names. By transferring a domain name from the domain name registrant to a trademark owner, the court implies that domain names that are
identical or substantially similar to distinctive trademarks are considered
property. Only those domain names that are identical or similar to distinc230

Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492.

231 Id. at 485-86.
232 Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502.
233 Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
234 Caesars World, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 504 (finding the defendant's argument unpersuasive and
holding the ACPA constitutional).
235 Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 492 (noting the nexus exists between the registry and
the domain name). See also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va.
2000) (affirming the ruling and reasoning in Caesars World).
236 Immediately after the Caesars World decision, in rem actions become a popular tool for trademark owners in cybersquatting cases. See, e.g., Cable News Network, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484; Jack In The
Box, Inc. v. jackinthebox.org, 143 F. Supp. 2d 590 (E.D. Va.2001); Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-club.com, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1798 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Shri Ram Mission v. sahajmarg.org, 139 F. Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va.
2001); Fleetboston Fin. Corp. v. fleetbostonfinancial.com, 138 F. Supp. 2d 121 (D. Mass. 2001); Hartog
& Co. A.S. v. swix.com, 136 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2001); Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A. v.
casinoalitalia.com, 128 F. Sapp. 2d 340 (E.D. Va. 2001); Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com,
112 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 2000); Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 110 F. Supp. 2d
420 (E.D. Va. 2000); Heathmount A.E., Inc. v. technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va. 2000);
Am. Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848 (E.D. Va. 2000); Broadbridge Media, L.L.C. v. hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Lucent Techs., 95 F. Supp. 2d 528.
237 See, e.g., Broadbridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (ordering the registrar to transfer the
domain name hypercd.com registered by defendant Henderson to plaintiff who owned the trademark
HyperCD); Heathmount, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 868 (ordering NSI to deposit domain names technodome.com and destinationtechnodome.com in registry with the court pending defendant's appearance
or a default judgment).
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tive trademarks are subject as a res for in rem actions, and the court can
order the taking of the res by transferring the domain names to the trademark owner who did not own the domain names originally. 238 Consequently, domain names that are generic or merely descriptive are not considered property because no trademark owner could bring a successful in
rem action against such domain names because the trademark owner does
not have a protectable trademark. That is, the trademark is not distinctive,
to initiate the in rem proceeding. 239 This is contrary to the commercial reality of generic or merely descriptive domain names. In the Internet economy, generic domain names are highly valued, in demand, and treated as
brands. Such domain names are more capable of existing apart from the
value or goodwill added by the user, as compared to domain names that are
identical to protectable trademarks. 24 ° The bundle of rights does reside in
these generic domain names.24' Yet, such domain names are not deemed
"property" in in rem actions because they are not protectable trademarks.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL DISSONANCE
The dissonance flowing from the ACPA and related judicial opinions
creates a barrier to exploiting cyberproperty in commercial transactions. If
domain names are not correctly classified as property interests, then they
cannot be used as collateral in secured transactions.2 42 This will undermine
238 Broadbridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (finding plaintiff owns a distinctive trademark,
"HyperCD" and awarding the domain name hypercd.com to the plaintiff); see also Parchomovsky,
supra note 31, at 228-29.
239 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1) (ownership of a distinctive or famous mark as statutory
element); Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportman's Market, Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 497 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the distinctive and famous elements of ACPA claim); Broadbridge Media, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 510
(holding that in an in rem action under the ACPA a plaintiff must demonstrate, among other things, that
it owns a distinctive trademark at the time of the registration of the domain name).
240 Dorer v. Abel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560-61 (E.D. Va. 1999) (comparing domain names that are
protected under trademark law and domain names that are not, but enjoy "significant value in the open
market"); Kremen v. Cohen, 2000 WL 1811403, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2000) (holding the generic
domain name sex.con not protectable as trademark); Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (observing that in a conversion tort action against the registrar of the domain name
sex.com, conversion tort law is arbitrary because it recognizes conversion of intangible property merged
with a document while excludes wholly intangible property). The court suggested the legislature fashion
an appropriate statutory scheme to protect "dormant domain names unprotected by trademark law." kd
241 Conrad, supra note 6, at 430.
242 U.C.C. § 9-102(12) (2001) ("Collateral means the property subject to a security interest."). A
security interest is an interest in personal property which secures payment or performance of an obligation. Id. § 1-201(37). If domain names are used as collateral in secured transactions, domain names are
most likely be classified as "general intangibles" under the Revised Article 9 Uniform Commercial
Code. Id. § 9-102(a)(42) cmt. 5(d) ("'General intangible' is the residual category of personal property,
including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are
various categories of intellectual property.... As used in the definition of "general intangible," "things
in action" includes rights that arise under a license of intellectual property, including the right to exploit
the intellectual property without liability for infringement.")
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the maturity process that e-commerce is currently undertaking as it moves
toward traditional secured financing, not just equity financing.24 3 Since the
nature of cyberspace allows e-companies to utilize and rely primarily on
intangible property, such intangible property has become the most valuable
corporate assets of such companies244 and needs to be alienable for commercial transactions, or able to serve as collateral in secured financing
schemes.
Further, if domain names are not correctly classified as property, they
will be excluded from the bankruptcy estate.24 5 They could not be legitimately valued, yet they are the most valuable remaining assets of failed ecompanies heading toward bankruptcy proceedings.246 Valuation of domain
names will be meaningless if they are not deemed to be property. 247 This
will lead to miscalculation of the overall value of the bankrupt cyber-estate
and subsequently creditors' rights.248
The problem of judicial dissonance relating to classification of domain
names rests on the fear of encountering the unknown. Courts are comfortable with trademark law, and are thus at ease in applying it to domain
names. When a domain name does not fit squarely within trademark law, it
is easier to duck the issue because it is "knotty." Similarly, courts rely on
archaic principles of law relating to garnishment and tort of conversion
theory, ignoring the bundle of rights that resides in domain names. Congress did not fare any better; it passed the ACPA to cure cybersquatting
problems encountered by protectable trademarks registered as domain
names in bad faith by cybersquatters. The ACPA overlooks the effect of
that legislation, generating a system that classifies some domain names as
property, while denying that classification to others.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing domain names as intangible property is a step in the right
direction to formulating appropriate statutory protection for generic or
merely descriptive domain names that are not protected under trademark
243

Krisko, supra note 94 (noting that private equity financing has fallen dramatically in the last

year, forcing both e-companies and their creditors to look to a more reliable form of financing such as

secured financing).
244 See generally Dickerson, supra note 4, at 299-301 (discussing the changing nature of the
bankrupt estate moving from tangible to intangible assets).
245 See generally Conrad, supra note 6, at 430.
246
247

Id.
Id. at 420 (discussing proper methodologies to value cyberproperty domain names and noting

that valuation techniques rest on a threshold question that must be resolved: whether domain names are
property).
248 See generally Dickerson, supra note 4, at 299-301 (discussing the importance of the evolving
nature of the bankrupt estate).
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law. 249 Forcing existing trademark law to protect generic or merely descriptive domain names would destroy the established trademark jurisprudence
developed by both statutory and common law. 250 To ignore the impact these
domain names in cyberspace and e-commerce would lead to more disarray
among judicial decisions relating to domain names, and would have costly
consequences to domain name holders, creditors, and other participants in
corporate financing in cyberspace.

249 Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (recognizing domain names as
intangible property and noting the limitation of archaic conversion law as applied to domain names).
250 See generally Merges, supra note 22, at 2214-15 (observing that descriptive and generic domain names such as drugs.com and loans.com are valuable, but may not received trademark protection);
Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigmin E-commerce? Move Over Inherently Distinctive Trademarks, The E-brand, I-brand and Generic Domain Names Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
937, 958-78 (2001) (analyzing the effects of extending protection to generic domain names under
trademark law and unfair competition); Branson, supra note 90, at 287 (concluding that protection for
descriptive and generic domain names is an uphill battle under the existing trademark and unfair competition law).

